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RACE, AUSTRALIAN COLONIALISM AND TECHNOLOGIES OF 
MOBILITY IN KALGOORLIE 
 
KIERAN TRANTER* AND THALIA ANTHONY** 
This article argues that the legal texts that record the death of Indigenous boy Elijah 
Doughty in a reserve in Kalgoorlie-Boulder in 2016 highlights the intersections of 
technologies of mobility within the Australian colonial project. Elijah died when 
the small motorcycle he was riding was run over by a large utility vehicle driven by 
the non-Indigenous assailant, ‘WSM’. This occurred within a wider social media 
centred context of racist anxieties and hate speech directed towards Indigenous 
children being in public and mobile around Kalgoorlie-Boulder. Elijah’s death and 
the subsequent legal reactions, to Indigenous protests, to the endurance of social 
media racist hate speech directed to Kalgoorlie-Boulder’s Indigenous children, to 
determining the location of the trial and who can speak at the trial, to the concern 
and pity expressed towards ‘WSM’, shows how technologies of mobility, reinstate 
and bolster colonial mobilities and their destructive effects on Indigenous people. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Mobility and its constraints have been central to Australian colonialism and 
colonial claims to sovereign jurisdiction.1 Controlling the movement of peoples, 
livestock, and goods has been an essential feature of the Australian state since 
the British imposed its penal-colony on Gadigal Country at what is now known 
as Port Jackson. The dispossession of land through the squatting of non-
Indigenous ‘colonists’, the violent segregation and dispersals of Indigenous 
people, and the exploitation of a ‘waltzing’ non-Indigenous labour force and 
indentured Indigenous workers — particularly in the pastoral industry in 
Western Australia, the Northern Territory and Queensland — helped expand 
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1 See generally Georgine Clarsen, ‘“Australia – Drive It Like You Stole It”: Automobility as a Medium 
of Communication in Settler Colonial Australia' (2017) 12(4) Mobilities 520. 
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the colonial project from the late eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth 
century.2 
While transformations in the means and modes of mobility have created 
new identities for states, in settler states, such as Australia, the colonial project 
has endured with the constraining of Indigenous peoples’ freedom of 
movement through new technological means.3 The necessity of the motor 
vehicle for stolen generation policies4 and controls on driving and movement 
on Country, including through the penal regime of the Northern Territory 
Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth) and Western Australia’s restrictions to 
access homelands,5 are specific examples where technologies of mobility were 
deployed to control and restrict Indigenous people’s movement.6 
This paper is about the traces left in law by the intersections of 
technologies of mobility within the Australian colonial project. It takes as its 
study the death of 14-year-old Indigenous boy, Elijah Doughty, on the morning 
of 29 August 2016 in Kalgoorlie-Boulder, Western Australia. His death 
occurred amidst a storm of violent racism directed towards Indigenous people 
accused of stealing motorcycles on social media. Elijah died when the small 
motorcycle he was riding was run over by a Nissan Navara ute driven by the 
non-Indigenous assailant, ‘WSM’.7 The incident happened off-road as WSM 
chased the motorcycle. WSM believed that the motorcycle had been stolen from 
his residence the day before. The police had informed WSM where he might 
find his stolen motorcycle and WSM pursued the motorcycle intending to 
apprehend the rider.8 
WSM’s spontaneous vigilantism became a flash point within Kalgoorlie-
Boulder. For elements of the non-Indigenous community, his actions were 
refracted through an existing racist ‘law and order’ narrative advocating 
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3 Harry Blagg and Thalia Anthony, Decolonising Criminal Justice (Palgrave, forthcoming). 
4 Consider generally Kieran Tranter, 'Mad Max: The Car and Australian Governance' (2003) 5(1) 
National Identities 67. 
5 Thalia Anthony, ‘Governing Crime in the Intervention’ (2009) 27(2) Law in Context 90; Thalia 
Anthony and Harry Blagg, ‘STOP in the Name of Who’s Law? Driving and the Regulation of 
Contested Space in Central Australia’ (2013) 22(1) Social and Legal Studies 43. 
6 Thalia Anthony, ‘Labour Relations on Northern Cattle Stations: Feudal Exploitation and 
Accommodation’ (2004) 4(3) The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs 117. 
7 The driver is known by this pseudonym at sentencing. In early reports he is referred to as ‘MWSD’. 
8 State of Western Australia v WSM [2017] WASCSR 128. The authors received permission from the 
Western Australian Supreme Court Registrar to purchase these sentencing remarks for the purpose of 
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extrajudicial action to combat Indigenous youths.9 The Kalgoorlie-Boulder 
Indigenous community, and Indigenous communities across Australia, 
regarded WSM actions and Elijah Doughty’s death as a coming to pass of these 
racist threats. Further, the local Indigenous community was concerned that a 
predominately non-Indigenous jury empanelled in Kalgoorlie would not be 
impartial, including because vigilante social media sites continued to operate 
despite Indigenous calls for authorities to shut them down. Grievances led to 
peaceful protests by over 200 people on 30 August 2016 when WSM was 
scheduled for a mention at Kalgoorlie courthouse.10 After it was learnt that 
WSM was charged with manslaughter — rather than murder — and that several 
of Elijah’s family members and friends were denied entry to the court 
proceedings, some protesters broke windows and the court building was 
evacuated, police locked down the city, and riot police were deployed.11 At 
about the same time, there was also an arson attack on the WSM’s rental 
residence, although investigations did not uncover the offender or motivation. 
In relation to the legal process, the issue became what to do with WSM. 
The Indigenous community placed strong pressure on the prosecutor to 
institute a prosecution for murder, although this was denied and instead 
prosecutions were brought for dangerous driving causing death and 
manslaughter. At law, there were two discrete hearings that were dealt with in 
separate decisions of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The first, 
MWSD v State of Western Australia [2017] WASC 125 (‘MWSD’), concerned 
the question of the locale of trial. This matter concerned the balance between a 
fair trial for WSM and justice for Elijah Doughty’s family along with the 
perceived practicalities of a militarised police operation to secure the court if it 
was scheduled in Kalgoorlie.12 It also dealt with an (unsuccessful) application 
for amicus curiae from relatives of Elijah Doughty to address the accused’s 
application for a change of location. The second, State of Western Australia v 
WSM [2017] WASCSR 128 (WSM), concerned WSM’s sentencing. WSM had 
been convicted by a Perth jury — that did not have a single Indigenous jury 
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10 MWSD v State of Western Australia [2017] WASC 125 (5 May 2017) [49]–[54] (Jenkins J). 
11 Andrea Booth, ‘Why Clashes May Be the Shot at Justice Kalgoorlie Needs: Pastor’, SBS News 
(online), 2 September 2016 <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/why-clashes-may-be-the-shot-at-justice-
kalgoorlie-needs-pastor>. 
12 MWSD v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASC 125 (5 May 2017). 
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member — of dangerous driving causing death and was found not guilty of 
manslaughter.13 
We argue that these legal decisions, which record the incident and 
aftermath, disclose the intertwining of mobility and technology within the 
ongoing colonialist enterprise of the Australian settler state. This detailed 
engagement with the legal texts is in five sections. The first section sets out the 
immediate context of Kalgoorlie-Boulder, a town shaped by movement and 
conflict which was particularly manifest within the social media activities of 
members of the non-Indigenous community before 29 August 2016. The 
second connects Elijah Doughty’s death specifically to the motor vehicle. The 
third sees mobility and the cascade of violence in the immediate aftermath of 
the crime and the question for the mobile justice of settler state law where 
WSM’s trial should be held. The fourth looks to the question of punishment — 
how the law should respond to the violent use of a motor vehicle — finding a 
remarkable set of statements where the death of an Indigenous child within a 
context of racist vigilantism is minimalised and the rights and racist 
righteousness of motor vehicle owning and driving non-Indigenous men are 
given credence by the settler state. It compares the favourable sentencing 
remarks in WSM with the more condemning remarks of the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia in other, arguably less callous, driving causing death 
incidents. The final section deals with WSM’s movements after sentencing. 
Running through these sections is a continual anxiety about the politics of 
movement — who can and who cannot move through the world in specific 
ways. 
Central to the analysis that follows is a concern with the reoccurrence of 
motifs and themes of mobility within legal texts. ‘Mobility’ is a contested term. 
In recent decades ‘mobility’ has been an ascending concept in social thought. 
Globalisation and digital communication technologies have presented a world 
where space and time has become compressed; where people, ideas, and capital 
are seemingly free to move within a global world-system. Vincent Kaufmann 
has warned against some of the celebratory naivety associated with this 
definition.14 Movement of people, ideas, and capital does mean a victory of 
fluidity over structure. Recent decades might have witnessed an increase in the 
speed of movement, but it does not mean that the structures and purposes 
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14 Vincent Kaufmann, Re-Thinking Mobility: Contemporary Sociology (Routledge, 2016) 3–4. 
2019]  103 
 
 Race, Australian Colonialism and Technologies of 
Mobility in Kalgoorlie 
driving the transfers are also in flux. John Urry’s ‘automobility’ is an example of 
a more nuanced conceptualisation of mobility. Urry looks at the complex 
intertwining networks of culture, economy, infrastructure, global trade, and law 
that stabilises and normalises the ‘car system’ in Western societies.15 Mobility 
and technologies of movement can be transformative but are often conservative 
— maintaining their own systemic functions and facilitating established and 
orthodox power relations. This paper shares this orientation. To be mobile does 
not mean to be free and autonomous. Rather, through a detailed analysis of the 
legal texts concerned with Elijah Doughty’s death, and the trial and sentencing 
of WSM, the reoccurrence of motifs and themes of mobility are identified. In 
this identification the colonial politics of mobility in Australia comes into focus. 
II MOVEMENT AND CONFLICT IN KALGOORLIE-BOULDER 
Elijah Doughty died on the morning of 29 August 2016 on a track at Gribble 
Creek Reserve, located in Kalgoorlie-Boulder. Kalgoorlie-Boulder is a town of 
movement and conflict. Located on the goldfields in the western desert of 
Western Australia, 600 kilometres east of Perth. Kalgoorlie-Boulder is a large 
town by inland Australian standards. At the 2016 census it had a population of 
30 059 with 2 147 identifying as Indigenous.16 Most of the residents worked in 
the mining industry.17 With mining comes wealth for mining corporations and 
high incomes for their predominantly non-Indigenous workforce.18 The 
evidence can be seen in the economic demographics of Kalgoorlie-Boulder 
where there are higher rates of fulltime employment and higher personal and 
household incomes than the Western Australian and national averages, and 
substantially higher than the incomes of non-Indigenous Australians; including 
in Kalgoorlie-Boulder.19 This income is being spent: 47% of households were 
paying a mortgage and 61% had two or more motor vehicles.20 
                                                
15 See generally John Urry, 'The “System” of Automobility' (2004) 21(4–5) Theory, Culture and 
Society 25. 
16 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016 Census Quick Stats: Kalgoorlie-Boulder (3 September 2018) 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 
<http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduct/census/2016/quickstat/LGA54280>. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See generally Kersty Hobson, ‘“Say No to the ATO”: The Cultural Politics of Protest Against the 
Australian Tax Office' (2004) 3(1) Social Movement Studies 51. 
19 Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 16. 
20 Ibid. 
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The issue of mobility is deeply connected with mining in Australia. Waves 
of immigration generated by mining booms brought interactions between 
Indigenous land owners and the incoming miners, and also brought people 
from diverse cultural backgrounds to the minefields.21 The booms and busts of 
the mining cycle, and scarcity of resources, led to conflict. The antagonism and 
violence towards Chinese on the colonial gold fields is well studied.22 So has the 
colonial practice of removing Indigenous people to facilitate Western 
Australian mining.23 The colonial experience of mining bringing conflict 
continues. The recent mining boom saw significant conflict arising from 
perceptions of crime and violence within rural farming communities against 
‘fly in; fly out’ (‘FIFO’) workers,24 as well as by non-Indigenous newcomers — 
including, WSM — against Indigenous children. 
Kalgoorlie-Boulder has shared this history of movement and conflict. For 
instance, before World War Two there were several riots directed towards 
Southern Europeans.25 Its history of violent take-over of Wangkatja land 
enabled non-Indigenous corporations and people to profit from exploiting 
Indigenous land and benefit from the subordination of Wangkatja people.26 
The criminal law has played a role in regulating the conflict between miners 
and Wangkatja people in the interests of the order and morality of the 
settlement. This includes records of police raiding local camps and attempting 
                                                
21 See generally David Goodman, Gold Seeking: Victoria and California in the 1850s (Stanford 
University Press, 1994). 
22 See generally Sophie Loy-Wilson, 'Coolie Alibis: Seizing Gold from Chinese Miners in New South 
Wales' (2017) 91 International Labor and Working-Class History 28; Fei Sheng, 'Creating the 
Threatening “Others”: Environment, Chinese immigrants and Racist Discourse in Colonial Australia' 
in Marco Armiero and Richard Tucker (eds), Environmental History of Modern Migrations 
(Routledge, 2017) 124, 140; Mae M Ngai, 'Chinese Gold Miners and the “Chinese Question” in 
Nineteenth-Century California and Victoria' (2015) 101(4) Journal of American History 1082. 
23 See generally Mark Finnane and John McGuire, 'The Uses of Punishment and Exile: Aborigines in 
Colonial Australia' (2001) 3(2) Punishment and Society 279. 
24 Kerry Carrington et al, 'Crime Talk, FIFO Workers and Cultural Conflict on the Mining Boom 
Frontier' (2012) 53 Australian Humanities Review 1; Kerry Carrington and Margaret Pereira, 
'Assessing the Social Impacts of the Resources Boom on Rural Communities' (2011) 21(1) Rural 
Society 2. 
25 Sarah Gregson, ‘“It All Started on the Mines'? The 1934 Kalgoorlie Race Riots Revisited” (2001) 80 
Labour History 21; John N Yiannakis, 'Kalgoorlie Alchemy: Xenophobia, Patriotism and the 1916 
Anti-Greek Riots' (1996) 11(2) Early Days: Journal of the Royal Western Australian Historical Society 
199. 
26 See generally W J K Christensen, ‘Aborigines of Kalgoorlie-Boulder’ in Ronald M Berndt and 
Catherine H Berndt (eds), Aborigines of the West: Their Past and their Present (University of 
Western Australia Press, 1979) 126. 
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to regulate sexual relations between miners and Wangkatja women.27 This 
history of conflict between the Indigenous community and non-Indigenous 
people in Kalgoorlie-Boulder has continued to shape the relationship in more 
recent decades. A 2000 study found that members of the non-Indigenous 
community in Kalgoorlie-Boulder had more prejudicial attitudes towards 
Indigenous people compared to Perth residents.28 In 2002, the Australian 
Human Rights Commission specifically identified racism in Kalgoorlie-Boulder 
as a particular problem and attempted to facilitate greater social harmony and 
respect through a series of inter-community meetings.29 
By 2016, as the gulf between the wealth of the Indigenous and non-
Indigenous residents grew, adverse attitudes held by members of the non-
Indigenous community in Kalgoorlie-Boulder towards Indigenous people 
intensified. A moral panic about Indigenous offending manifested on Facebook 
and social media over the 2010s.30 A feature of this discourse was expressions of 
explicit violence towards Indigenous people, particularly Indigenous children.31 
Like earlier documented moral panics in Western Australia,32 the express target 
was Indigenous children who were seen as lawless, causing damage to persons 
and property, and who were not being adequately dealt with by the criminal 
justice system.33 The tenor of this discourse was towards vigilantism and 
encouraging extrajudicial violence. In the days prior to Elijah Doughty’s death, 
posts on the then two main crime sites, ‘Kalgoorlie Crimes Whinge and Whine’ 
and ‘Name Shame Crimes Kalgoorlie’, were explicit and horrifying. In response 
to a woman posting about observing two Indigenous youths breaking into a 
vehicle, another had commented ‘feel free to run these oxygen thieves off the 
road if you see them’ and another posted ‘[e]veryone talks about hunting down 
                                                
27 See generally Mary Anne Jebb, 'The Lock Hospitals Experiment: Europeans, Aborigines and 
Venereal Disease' (1984) 8 Studies in Western Australian History 68; Sandra Wilson, 'Police Work: 
The Role of the Police in the Kalgoorlie Community, 1897–1898' (1982) 6(11) Journal of Australian 
Studies 9. 
28 See generally Anne Pedersen et al, 'Attitudes Toward Aboriginal Australians in City and Country 
Settings' (2000) 35 Australian Psychologist 109. 
29 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Annual Report 2002-2003, Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission, (2003) 40, 152–4. 
30 Thalia Anthony and Craig Longman, 'Blinded by the White: A Comparative Analysis of Jury 
Challenges on Racial Grounds' (2017) 6(3) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social 
Democracy 25, 37. 
31 Cunneen and Russell, above n 9, 11. 
32 See generally Neil Morgan, 'Capturing Crims or Capturing Votes? The Aims and Effects of 
Mandatories' (1999) 22 University of New South Wales Law Journal 267. 
33 Cunneen and Russell, above n 9, 11–12. 
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these sub human mutts, but no one ever does’.34 Further, it seemed that these 
racist discourses were not limited to a small enclave within the non-Indigenous 
community. Rather, out of a town of 30 000, the two sites had 18 000 followers 
combined.35 These site were not only spaces for hate speech, but involved the 
dissemination of images of Indigenous youths in public. In May 2016, an image 
of Elijah Doughty riding his own motorcycle was uploaded.36 A post 
underneath was ‘Run the f***kers over’.37 
The racist and violent social media discourse in the months before Elijah 
Doughty’s death had a particular connection with mobility. The violence 
directed to Indigenous young people involved using motor vehicles as weapons 
— for example, exhortations between the non-Indigenous social media 
prosumers to use their motor vehicles to ‘run over’ Indigenous children. This 
seems to be in response to anxieties over the mobility of Indigenous children — 
that they were moving in public spaces and that they were riding motorcycles. 
And, that this illicit and affronting public movement needed to be surveilled 
and documented through posts and images. Troubling in itself that this racist 
and hateful speech was allowed to flourish in Australian communities,38 Elijah 
Doughty’s death on 29 August 2016 brought a confluence of word and deed. 
III ELIJAH DOUGHTY’S DEATH AND MOTOR VEHICLES 
Elijah Doughty died when he was knocked off the motorcycle he was riding and 
was run over by WSM’s vehicle. This ‘event’, as the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia repeatedly described this serious crime,39 happened in Gribble Creek 
Reserve near Clancy Street on the Boulder side of Kalgoorlie-Boulder. Gribble 
                                                
34 James Purtill, 'Racist. Violent. Deleted: The Facebook Posts Dividing Kalgoorlie', Triple J Hack 
(online), 1 September 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/the-facebook-posts-
dividing-kalgoorlie/7805346>. 
35 Cunneen and Russell, above n 9, 11. 
36 Paul Toohey, 'The Seething Streets of Kalgoorlie-Boulder, WA, Where Racism Towards Indigenous 
Boys Has Hit a Flashpoint' Perth Now (online) 13 November 2016 
<https://www.perthnow.com.au/news/wa/the-seething-streets-of-kalgoorlie-boulder-wa-where-
racism-towards-indigenous-boys-has-hit-a-flashpoint-ng-d47a67bb37f772da4239e83dbb31ae13>. 
37 Ibid. See also Larissa Behrendt, 'Debbie Carmody - Kalgoorlie Unrest Following the Death of a 14 
Year Old Boy' Speaking Out (online) 11 September 2016 
<http://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/speakingout/kalgoorlie‐unrest‐following‐death‐
ofteenager/7832164>. 
38 See Cunneen and Russell, above n 9. 
39 State of Western Australia v WSM [2017] WASCSR 128 (21 July 2017) [6], [11], [13] (Martin CJ). 
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Creek Reserve is an area of open bush land running through Kalgoorlie-
Boulder criss-crossed by dirt tracks. Figure 1 shows the view onto Gribble 
Creek Reserve from Clancy Street. At trial, CCTV evidence from a house on 
Clancy Street showed the motorcycle Elijah Doughty was riding entering 
Gribble Creek Reserve at this point and progressing along the south-west track, 
followed by the vehicle driven by WSM.40 This footage of a chase, of a small 
rider on a small motorcycle being followed by a large four-wheel drive utility 
vehicle, immediately prioritises automobility as the primary site of conflict. 
 
 
Figure 1: Gribble Creek Reserve from Clancy Street. Source Google Maps 
accessed 20 May 2018 
The two Supreme Court of Western Australia decisions establish a 
narrative of the actions leading up to and after the chase. WSM had returned 
home the evening before to find his rental property broken into and two 
motorcycles missing.41 In response to WSM’s notification of the thefts, the 
police that attended his property suggested that often stolen motorcycles were 
being used in the nearby Gribble Creek Reserve.42 It is not clear from the 
                                                
40 Ibid [6]. 
41 Ibid [2]. 
42 Ibid [3]. 
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judgments what was intended by those remarks. There is no indication that the 
police investigated Gribble Creek Reserve for the missing motorcycles on the 
evening of the 28 August 2016 or the following morning. Indeed, the remarks 
seemed to be directed towards, and were interpreted by WSM, as tacit approval 
for him to go to Gribble Creek Reserve to find the missing bikes and the ‘perps’ 
who took them. 
WSM had a brief search of Gribble Creek Reserve on the evening of the 28 
August 2016. He took the next day off work to continue the search. 43 A key 
feature of automobility has been affection — that motor vehicles take on 
meanings beyond utilitarian transport and become intertwined with identity 
and expressions of self.44 The object of affection for WSM was described in the 
decisions as ‘a white 50 cc Honda’ that had sentimental value to his wife.45 
However, it was not the l’objet de l’affection of the Honda that WSM identified 
Elijah Doughty riding. Rather, WSM found during the morning search Elijah 
Doughty riding the other stolen motorcycle, described as red, 70 cc, Chinese 
made, and of limited sentimental value.46 
The subsequent chase was brief. It lasted just over 20 seconds.47 At 
sentencing, the Supreme Court accepted WSM’s account that the motorcycle 
had swerved unexpectedly into the path of his vehicle.48 The Supreme Court 
relied upon forensic evidence that determined that at the point of impact 
WSM’s vehicle was possibly travelling at over 60 kilometres per hour — 20 
kilometres per hour faster than the determined speed of the motorcycle.49 
Further, the Supreme Court accepted evidence that the injuries to Elijah 
Doughty and the damage to the motorcycle were consistent with being run over 
by a large, fast moving vehicle.50 It also determined that Elijah Doughty died 
instantly through massive trauma.51 
                                                
43 Ibid. 
44 Sarah Redshaw, In the Company of Cars: Driving as a Social and Cultural Practice (Ashgate, 2008); 
Kylie Doyle and Kieran Tranter, 'Automobility and “My Family” Stickers' (2015) 29(1) Continuum: 
Journal of Media and Cultural Studies 70. 
45 State of Western Australia v WSM [2017] WASCSR 128 (21 July 2017) [2] (Martin CJ). 
46 Ibid [5]. 
47 Ibid [10]. 
48 Ibid [9]. 
49 Ibid [8]. 
50 Ibid [10]. 
51 Ibid. 
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At one level, to adopt the Supreme Court’s repeatedly used term in the 
sentencing remarks, this ‘tragedy’52 of a motorcyclist dying in an accident with a 
vehicle is just that; another, often repeated tragedy, that has come with the 
current forms of automobility. Elijah Doughty was another Indigenous kid in a 
regional town who died riding a motorcycle. That integration of the motor 
vehicle into the everyday of Australian lives, economy, and culture is so 
complete that there are well established laws and administering regimes to 
account for the human lives lost to motor vehicles. In 2016, there were 194 road 
fatalities in Western Australia.53 This total included 13 children Elijah 
Doughty’s age54 and 40 motorcyclists.55 It is possible that Elijah Doughty is not 
counted in this number. It could be that the thanatological mechanisms that 
keep account of the road toll might not have registered Elijah Doughty’s death 
on the ‘tracks’ in Gribble Creek Reserve as within jurisdiction. Elijah Doughty 
was not wearing safety equipment, although the medical evidence of his injuries 
was that helmet, jackets, and leggings would not have saved his life. In the eyes 
of the system, death from motor vehicles is a familiar, mundane, ever-present 
reality of contemporary automobility — something regretted but accepted.56 
Something so normal and every-day that there are annual reports and ‘real-
time’ websites keeping account. That a child died using a motor vehicle in a 
collision with another motor vehicle is, for the courts, unremarkably tragic. 
There is a second unremarkable intertwining of automobility and law 
embedded in Elijah Doughty’s death. The motor vehicle can be a vector of 
crime — transporting criminals and their loot. Or instead, an instrument of 
crime — a mobile space in which sexual assault can occur or weaponised as an 
instrument of terror.57 Vehicles can also be the object of crime.58 Elijah 
Doughty’s death stemmed from the theft of two motorcycles. Motorcycle theft 
within Kalgoorlie-Boulder was a particular focus of the social media moral 
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 Road Safety Commission, 2016 Summary: Preliminary Fatal and Critical Injuries on Western 
Australian Roads, Road Safety Commission (2017) 13 table 3. 
54 Ibid 17 table 6. 
55 Ibid 20. 
56 Tranter, above n 2, 180. 
57 Thalia Anthony and Kieran Tranter, 'Car Crime in the Popular Imagination' in Nicole Rafter (ed), 
Oxford Research Encyclopaedia, Criminology and Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2016) 
DOI 10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.013.21. 
58 Ibid. 
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panic in the lead up to 29 August 2016.59 Indeed, Elijah Doughty’s own 
motorcycle had been stolen. There was no finding or indication that Elijah 
Doughty was involved in the theft from WSM’s residence.60 Nevertheless, for 
‘regional’ Western Australia in 2016-2017, there were 1 687 reports of stolen 
motor vehicles61 and 5 763 burglaries of dwellings.62 It could be expected that 
the offences against WSM are included in these statistics. In this there is 
nothing remarkable. Crimes against property have been reported and tallied. 
Stripped of its temporal location, the ‘event’ of 29 August 2016 is another 
tragic manifestation of automobility. Elijah Doughty died because of motor 
vehicles. He died because he was riding a motorcycle and he was hit and run 
over by a larger and heavier vehicle. He died because the vehicle that hit him 
was being driven by a man incensed that his motor vehicle property had been 
stolen. Australian law has had over 100 years to come to a reckoning with the 
motor vehicle63 and the cost in lives and money of its attendant culture of 
automobility. The everydayness of this regulation of this specific form of 
mobility is well encapsulated through the legal texts of the ‘event’. 
IV MOBILITY AND CASCADES OF VIOLENCE AFTER THE ‘EVENT’ 
While in isolation Elijah Doughty’s death is another tragic loss of life to the 
motor vehicle. The simmering of racial violence on social media and in pursuits 
of Indigenous children by non-Indigenous drivers was unleashed with the 
                                                
59 Purtill, above n 34. See also MWSD v State of Western Australia [2017] WASC 125 (5 May 2017) 
[60] (Jenkins J). 
60 Martin CJ does make a brief comment that WSM’s belief that the motorcycle that Elijah Doughty 
was riding was his stolen red 70 cc Chinese made bike as ‘correct’: see State of Western Australia v 
WSM [2017] WASCSR 128 (21 July 2017) [32]. 
61 Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA) s 4 defines a ‘motor vehicle’ as a ‘means a self-
propelled vehicle that is not operated on rails.’ The Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) s 49AAA defines a 
‘motor cycle’ as a motor vehicle with two or three wheels. Under s 1 of the Criminal Code 1913 (WA) 
the definition of ‘motor vehicle’ in the Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA) is adopted. 
Following this, motorcycles are identified as a motor vehicle for reporting of motor vehicle thefts. 
62 Western Australian Police Force, Crime Statistics 
<https://www.police.wa.gov.au/Crime/CrimeStatistics#/>. 
63 See generally Kieran Tranter, '”The History of the Haste-Wagons”: The Motor Car Act 1909 (Vic), 
Emergent Technology and the Call for Law' (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 843. 
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killing of Elijah Doughty and tensions within the Indigenous community 
quickly reached boiling point.64 
Throughout the ongoing tensions, the Indigenous community perceived 
the police as facilitating the assailant and failing to properly investigate the 
killing in order to bring the assailant to justice.65 This police facilitation and 
mishandling of the matter not only occurred when the police directed WSM to 
Gribble Creek, but also straight after WSM caused Elijah Doughty’s death when 
the police failed to seal off the scene of the crime. During the cascade of 
violence, another technology of mobility becomes intertwined in the tragedy. 
This technology is directly introduced in the Supreme Court’s sentencing 
remarks. Speaking to WSM concerning his immediate actions after the 
incident, the Supreme Court narrates: 
After a little difficulty unlocking your telephone, you telephoned 000. However, 
after becoming exasperated by the fact that the operator of that service did not 
appear to be in Kalgoorlie or have any knowledge of the Kalgoorlie area, you 
discontinued that call and telephoned the policeman who had given you his 
number the previous evening.66 
This image of WSM frantically fumbling with his mobile telephone and 
trying to call help in the aftermath of the incident is familiar. The ubiquitous 
mobile telephone as a technology of mobility67 enables WSM to connect with 
the authorities within, apparently, moments of killing a child. The Supreme 
Court commends WSM’s action of calling for assistance and staying on the line 
and following the police officer’s directions.68 This act of linking into mobile 
technology is presented by the Supreme Court as partly redeeming WSM’s 
character after his offence. 
                                                
64 Laura Murphy-Oates, ‘Kids of Kalgoorlie: in The Wake of Elijah Doughty, Vigilantism Thrives’, SBS 
The Feed (online) 11 September 2017 <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/the-feed/kids-of-kalgoorlie-in-
the-wake-of-elijah-doughty-vigilantism-thrives>. 
65 Alex McKinnon, ‘Police Criticised Following Deaths’, The Saturday Paper (online) 28 July 2017 
<https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/thebriefing/2017/07/28>. 
66 State of Western Australia v WSM [2017] WASCSR 128 (21 July 2017) [11] (Martin CJ) (emphasis 
added). 
67 See generally Richard Ling, Taken for Grantedness: The Embedding of Mobile Communication into 
Society (MIT Press, 2012); Gerard Goggin, Cell Phone Culture: Mobile Technology in Everyday Life 
(Routledge, 2012). 
68 State of Western Australia v WSM [2017] WASCSR 128 (21 July 2017) [27] (Martin CJ). 
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While WSM’s use of his mobile phone might have been a means of 
mitigating against his dangerous use of his Nissan Navara, the wider mobile 
media in Kalgoorlie-Boulder after 29 August 2016 sought to aggravate the 
circumstances. Immediately, the tenor of posts on the non-Indigenous 
community crime social media forums became righteous: ‘[g]ood job you 
thieving bastard. Don’t think you’ll be touching another bike any time soon 
ahaha About time someone took it into their own hands hope it happens 
again’.69 Some were more circumspect ‘Condolences to the driver trying to get 
his bike back. Went a bit too far’,70 while others were explicitly and blatantly 
racist:  
Aboriginals…don’t deserve to live. That’s good that young boy got killed. 
Aboriginals don’t own Australia. Aboriginals live in the bush. They are filthy 
animals. They all need the death sentence.71 
For the Indigenous community, social media and mobile phones also 
became a focus after the incident. This happened three ways. First, Indigenous 
community members were seeing, documenting, and helping journalists 
archive the racist and inflammatory social media content from the crime 
forums. Second, members of the Indigenous community rallied around the 
#JusticeForElijah tag, which built on the momentum of Ferguson and the 
#BlackLivesMatter movement and challenged the mainstream media’s 
prejudicial reporting — most notably that Elijah Doughty had stolen the bike. 
Third, mobile phones and social media became a site for grief, outrage, and 
organisation. 
This use of social media and digital technologies connected to real world 
actions involving motor vehicles. Indigenous youths walking in public spaces 
and on motorbikes reported an increase in harassment from non-Indigenous 
drivers.72 There was a documented report of the arrest and charging with 
‘disorderly conduct’ of a single non-Indigenous driver in relation to a 
                                                
69 Social media post quoted in Purtill, above n 34. 
70 Social media post quoted in Chris Graham, 'White Man’s Manslaughter. Black Man’s Murder. 
White Man’s Riot. Black Man’s Uprising' New Matilida (online) 31 August 2016 
<https://newmatilda.com/2016/08/31/the-kalgoorlie-uprising-a-rational-response-to-another-black-
death/>. 
71 Social media post quoted in Toohey, above n 36. 
72 Ibid. 
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harassment incidence.73 Elijah Doughty’s grandfather had vehicles lurking and 
hooning around his property. The house WSM was renting was deliberately set 
alight and he lost all his property.74 A Justice Camp memorial to Elijah Doughty 
in Gribble Creek Reserve, where it was believed he died, was established. One of 
Elijah Doughty’s own relatives committed suicide at the Justice Camp.75 
However, while some of these were noted in passing in the legal texts, what 
happened on 30 August 2016 came to be more than a trace within the textual 
ruminations of the Supreme Court. This involved recounting of evidence 
provided by Inspector Anthony James Colfer of the ‘most frightening 
experience of his long police career’.76 Described variously as a ‘riot’77 and ‘anti-
social behaviour’,78 it details how a protest group of Indigenous people caused 
damage to the Kalgoorlie Courthouse and police vehicles.79 The extent of the 
damage included breaking several windows.  
Movement and mobility is critical to how the Supreme Court, in early 
proceedings, narrates this event through Colfer’s eyes. There was initially a 
protest gathering near the courthouse.80 Most of the gathering were then 
prevented from entering the courthouse, except the members of Elijah 
Doughty’s immediate family. There were multiple movements: 
A large number of the group … rushed towards the courthouse. The police were 
unprepared and outnumbered. Some of the group attempted to obtain access to the 
courthouse through the rear door. In their attempt they broke down the side gate to 
the courthouse in a violent manner. Colfer ran to the back of the courthouse and 
physically blocked their entry to it.81 
This description of movement of bodies was supplemented with 
description of movement of projectiles: ‘rocks and other like items’82 and ‘loose 
                                                
73 MWSD v State of Western Australia [2017] WASC 125 (5 May 2017) [59] (Jenkins J). 
74 Ibid. See also State of Western Australia v WSM [2017] WASCSR 128 (21 July 2017 [28] (Martin 
CJ). 
75 David Prestipino, 'Relative Suicides at Site Where Kalgoorlie Teenager Elijah Doughty Died' (2016)  
WA Today (online) https://www.watoday.com.au/national/western-australia/relative-suicides-at-site-
where-kalgoorlie-teenager-elijah-doughty-died-20161011-grzfcp.html accessed 30 May 2018. 
76 MWSD v State of Western Australia [2017] WASC 125 (5 May 2017) [71] (Jenkins J). 
77 Ibid [53], [55], [58]. 
78 Ibid [53]. 
79 Ibid [56]. 
80 Ibid [49]. 
81 Ibid [50]. 
82 Ibid [51]. 
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paving’83 thrown at the courthouse doors and at the ‘mobilised police’.84 There 
was a removal of non-police and security court staff from the courthouse and 
the cordoning off and clearing traffic from around the courthouse.85 The crowd 
dissipated when food was made available ‘some distance from the courthouse’.86 
Like with the road toll and the crime statistics, the Supreme Court 
supplements this intertwining of bodies, movement, and violence with 
numbers. In addition to the ‘approximately 200’87 protesters, there were also 
approximately 50 police officers, of which 15 were reported as physically 
injured.88 Thirty protesters were arrested and 55 charges laid.89 The numbers of 
protesters injured, however, was not documented by the Supreme Court despite 
footage indicating such injuries.90 Damage to police vehicles was precisely 
tallied as $34 077 and the repairs to the courthouse were $18 800.43 while the 
operational costs of the police deployment in response to the ‘incident’ was 
$290 000.91 
The point of the Supreme Court narrating moving bodies, violence, and 
numbers was to decide on where WSM should be tried. This story was located 
within a judicial calculus of whether the trial for manslaughter should be in 
Perth, as the Crown had organised, or Kalgoorlie as WSM lawyers had 
requested under s 135(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA). Also heard 
was an application by Petrina James, Elijah Doughty’s mother, and Albert 
Doughty, Elijah Doughty’s paternal grandfather, to intervene as amicus to 
introduce two affidavits to oppose the application for the venue of the trial by 
jury to be Kalgoorlie. 
The basis for their application was that the affidavits contained evidence 
not adduced by the State.92 They wanted to convey their own experiences of the 
Kalgoorlie community that would provide a distinct set of perspectives to those 
provided by the State. The application was rejected by the Supreme Court on 
the grounds that the State has the capacity to adduce such evidence if it saw it as 
                                                
83 Ibid [52]. 
84 Ibid [51]–[52]. 
85 Ibid [53]. 
86 Ibid [54]. 
87 Ibid [49]. 
88 Ibid [53]. 
89 Ibid [54]. 
90 ‘Tensions in Kalgoorlie Over Death of Aboriginal Teen’, Te Karere TVNZ (online) 31 August 2016 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3hnouofimPI>. 
91 MWSD v State of Western Australia [2017] WASC 125 (5 May 2017) [56] (Jenkins J). 
92 Ibid [7]–[9]. 
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relevant, and the amicus would bring nothing discrete to what the State may 
bring.93 The Court’s trust in the State’s knowledge of place — conveyed by the 
Perth-located Director of Public Prosecutions — reflects a postcolonial 
institutional rejection of Indigenous place-based knowledges and standpoints 
on the basis that the state has a universal and superior capacity for truth-
finding and truth-telling. There is a statement about the relationship between 
sovereignty and movement that is brutally evident in the Supreme Court’s 
dismissal of the amicus curiae application. The Court declares that questions of 
locale of trials and the directing of movement of peoples and resources to that 
site of justice belongs exclusively with the settler state. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court did not just reject Elijah Doughty’s family’s application on substantive 
grounds but also added that, as a matter of law, amicus cannot adduce evidence. 
It is a judgment that denies the very people to whom a mobile court descends 
on to deliver justice, a right to be heard in its determining of where that descent 
should happen. 
This is in stark contrast to WSM who, as the accused, had a statutory right 
to challenge where the trial was to be held. In response to his application, the 
Supreme Court balanced the issues of a fair trial with the risk to public safety 
and cost to the community if it was held in Kalgoorlie rather than Perth.94 It 
found that there was no risk to a fair trial if it was held in Perth and, meanwhile, 
there were potential risks to safety if the trial was in Kalgoorlie. The Supreme 
Court determined that it was an ‘exceptional case’95 by virtue of what took place 
outside of the Kalgoorlie courthouse at the committal and held that WSM was 
to be tried for manslaughter in Perth.  
The intertwining of mobile phones, bodies, and violence in the aftermath 
of the death of Elijah Doughty became a legal story of where the trial should be 
held. The State reserved to itself the location where its justice should be 
empanelled. This did not mean a decision based on abstract principles. The 
State took note, and kept a record of the situation in Kalgoorlie, and 
particularly the movements, damage, and costs that happened at the committal. 
What emerges from the Supreme Court judgment in MWSD v State of Western 
                                                
93 Ibid [22]. 
94 Ibid [36], [38]–[39]. 
95 Ibid [45]. 
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Australia96 is a practical and sophisticated mobile law; a law capable of moving 
in response to ‘events’ and movements at specific places. 
V (NOT) PUNISHING THE VIOLENT USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE 
At trial in Perth the all-white jury, controversially, found WSM not guilty 
of the manslaughter of Elijah Doughty. WSM was convicted, in the alternative, 
of the lesser offence of dangerous driving causing death in s 59 of the Road 
Traffic Act 1974 (WA). The deliberation for the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia was on the sentence — on what should be done with WMS. The 
Indigenous community felt there were substantial aggravating factors that 
warranted a long prison sentence, including the death of a child and the cruel 
and deliberate way in which Elijah was hit, and then driven over, by the four-
wheel. The Indigenous community saw the sentencing as an opportunity, once 
and for all, to send a message to the non-Indigenous community that the 
violent racism directed to Indigenous people (in the name of stamping out 
motorcycle theft) and the encouragement of the murderous use of motor 
vehicles to run down Indigenous people had to stop. 
They hoped the lines on the use of motor vehicles as a weapon deployed 
against Indigenous peoples would be drawn in favour of protecting Indigenous 
people through a harsh punishment that would encapsulate the harm of the 
crime, and its racial context, for both Elijah and Kalgoorlie’s Indigenous 
community as a whole. This was an opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
condemn the actions of the individual, WSM, and his role in Elijah’s death — 
whether advertent or inadvertent — in the broader racial violence directed 
towards Indigenous children. 
The elements of the offence of dangerous driving causing death under s 
59(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) entail: 
If a motor vehicle driven by a person (the driver) is involved in an incident 
occasioning the death of, or grievous bodily harm to another person and the driver 
was, at the time of the incident, driving the motor vehicle – 
(a)  while under the influence of alcohol to such an extent as to be incapable of 
having proper control of the vehicle; or 
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 (ba) while under the influence of drugs to such an extent as to be incapable of 
having proper control of the vehicle; or 
 (bb) while under the influence of alcohol and drugs to such an extent as to be 
incapable of having proper control of the vehicle; or 
(b) in a manner (which expression includes speed) that is, having regard to all 
the circumstances of the case, dangerous to the public or to any person, 
the driver commits a crime and is liable to the penalty in subsection (3).97 
 
The penalties in s 59(3) are provided as a gradient: 
 
A person convicted on indictment of an offence against this section is liable –  
(a) if the offence is against subsection (1)(a), (ba) or (bb), or the offence is against 
subsection (1)(b) and is committed in circumstances of aggravation, to a fine 
of any amount and to imprisonment for – 
(i) 20 years, if the person has caused the death of another person; or 
(ii) 14 years, if the person has caused grievous bodily harm to another 
person; or 
(b) in any other circumstances, to a fine of any amount and to imprisonment for 
–  
 (i) 10 years, if the person has caused the death of another person; or 
 (ii) 7 years, if the person has caused grievous bodily harm to another 
person, 
and, in any event, the court convicting that person shall order that he be 
disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for a period of not less than 
2 years.98 
 
Causing death or serious injury to a person while driving a motor vehicle 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol is the opprobrium that attracts the most 
serious penalties. 
In the absence of identifying intoxication or other aggravating factors, 
WSM was convicted under the lesser offence of s 59(1)(b)(i) of ‘driving a motor 
vehicle in a manner [which expression includes speed] that is, having regard to 
all the circumstances of the case, dangerous to the public or any person’99 and 
as such was liable to the penalties in s 59(3)(b)(i) of a maximum penalty of 10 
                                                
97 Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) s 59(1). 
98 Ibid s 59(3). 
99 Ibid s 59(1)(b). 
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years imprisonment. The maximum penalty was increased from four years’ 
imprisonment in 2008 to take into account the seriousness of the offence.100 
WSM was sentenced to three years imprisonment backdated from the time 
WSM was in custody (29 August 2016) with eligibility for parole, and driver’s 
licence disqualification for two-years.101 This penalty is well below the 
maximum sentence of 10 ‘years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court deemed 
the offence to lie at the ‘lower half’ of seriousness: ‘between the middle and 
lower end of that range’.102 The Court expressly did not regard the offence to be 
‘at the upper end of the range of [dangerous] driving’ offence’.103 The Supreme 
Court cited ‘significant mitigating factors’.104 These factors — that the speed of 
the vehicle was not ‘excessive’, the offender was not driving an unsafe vehicle, 
the offender was not driving in a way that was ‘recklessly indifferent to the 
consequences’, and that the offender was not under the influence of alcohol105 
— combined to make the sentencing remarks into a discourse on the good 
character of the offender. The Court’s favourable characterisation of WSM not 
only provided mitigation in itself, but also contributed to the Court’s 
acceptance of the WSM’s characterisation of the events, a characterisation that 
further reduced the offender’s culpability. 
The Supreme Court’s remarks in WSM lacked condemnation for the 
offender’s actions. Instead, there are expressions of sympathy for the hardship 
that WSM has faced following his offence. This contrasts with other sentencing 
remarks involving dangerous driving offences where the driving is described as 
‘outrageously bad’, ‘wholly dangerous and callous’106 and exhibiting ‘reckless 
behaviour of a high magnitude’.107 
                                                
100 The maximum penalty for dangerous driving occasioning death, where the offence is not 
committed in circumstances of aggravation, was increased from four years' imprisonment to 10 years' 
imprisonment with effect from 1 August 2008 by Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act 2008 
(WA) s 38. 
101 State of Western Australia v WSM [2017] WASCSR 128 (21 July 2017) [47] (Martin CJ). 
102 Ibid [21]–[22], [38] (Martin CJ). 
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104 Ibid [24]. 
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106 Devine v State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 94 (18 May 2010) [71] (McLure P, Buss JA 
and Jenkins J). See also Billing v State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 80 (21 April 2017) [23] 
(Buss P, Newnes and Mazza JJA). 
107 Kershaw v State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 111 (23 May 2014) [42], [114] (McLure P, 
Buss and Mazza JJA). 
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The Supreme Court’s repeated deployment of the term ‘tragedy’108 infers 
that Elijah Doughty’s death was unwilled. Other sentencing remarks, discussed 
below, are more inclined to focus on the ‘deliberate’ and ‘intentional’ nature of 
the dangerous driving, even in circumstances where there was no pursuit of a 
victim who ultimately died as was the case in WSM. For instance, in Devine v 
State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 94, a speeding 21-year-old driver 
lost control of his vehicle causing the death of one of his passengers and severe 
injuries to another. There were no other road users in the vicinity of the 
offender’s vehicle at the time.109 The Court of Appeal of Western Australia 
described the offender’s conduct as ‘calculated, premeditated and deliberate’.110 
In Lutumba v State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 172, an inexperienced 
29-year-old L-plate driver —in contrast to the professional driving experience 
of WSM — who was reluctantly driving his relatives who were in a rush to get 
to the airport,111 crashed with another vehicle causing the death of one person 
and injuries to five others. The collision occurred because the driver went onto 
the wrong side of a road to overtake a truck and travelled at an ‘unsafe distance 
behind the truck’.112 The sentencing judge and Western Australian Court of 
Appeal described the offender’s actions as ‘deliberate’.113 
The following sections outline the Supreme Court’s characterisation of the 
offence, the offender, and the victims in WSM through a close examination of 
the factors of speed, vehicle safety; WSM’s driving, and the absence of alcohol. 
It compares the characterisation of the offender and offence with other 
sentencing remarks by the Supreme Court of Western Australia for comparable 
charges. And, it finds that despite the other cases being less culpable, WSM is 
presented in a more favourable light. It further contends that the Supreme 
Court did not attend to the vigilante context of WSM’s dangerous driving that 
spurred on drivers to attack Indigenous children and failed to send a message of 
deterrence to this racist vigilante community in Kalgoorlie-Boulder. It finally 
argues that the Court does not sufficiently come to terms with the trauma that 
the killing caused — and continues to cause — Elijah Doughty’s family, local 
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community, and broader Indigenous community. Whether this was due to the 
failure of the prosecution to highlight these features114 or a blindness on the 
part of the Court, we argue that a consideration of these circumstances would 
have shed light on the gravity of the offence, aggravating factors, and the need 
for a strong message of condemnation of the offender and general deterrence. 
Instead, the Supreme Court ruled that it could not identify ‘any’ aggravating 
factors.115 
A Speed 
The Supreme Court deemed WSM to be at travelling at an average speed 67 
kilometres per hour and Elijah Doughty to be travelling at 46 kilometres per 
hour.116 The offender was driving over 20 kilometre per hour faster than the 
speed at which Elijah Doughty was travelling. And further, was accelerating his 
vehicle to reduce his distance from Elijah Doughty.117 As has been noted, the 
Supreme Court accepted that WSM was travelling at such a velocity that Elijah 
Doughty died instantaneously, and after his vehicle hit Elijah Doughty, WSM 
drove straight over him.118 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court concluded that 
WSM was not driving at high speed.119 This interpretation obviates the relative 
speed of the vehicles. While 67 kilometre per hour may not be excessive speed 
where the vehicle in front is travelling at a similar speed on a sealed road, it can 
be regarded as a dangerously high speed where the vehicle in front is riding at 
20 kilometres per hour slower on a dirt track. The dangerousness of the speed is 
intensified in this case by the fact that WSM’s Nissan Navara had the capacity 
to drive on bushy, uneven ground (see Figure 1) at speed, including through 
hazards, whereas the dirt bike driven by an inexperienced young rider was 
much more likely to struggle. The Court described the ground on Gribble 
Creek Reserve as made of red clay, grass, and gravel and on the 29 August 2016 
as wet, boggy, uneven, and in a state of deterioration.120 Given the relative 
capacities of the vehicles, and the drivers — and, that the offender was quickly 
                                                
114 State of Western Australia v WSM [2017] WASCSR 128 (21 July 2017) [23] (Martin C). 
115 Ibid. This reflects, as Martin CJ notes, the submissions by the State of Western Australia. 
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closing in on Elijah — the speed should have been considered dangerously 
‘high’ and ‘excessive’.  
In Timbrell v State of Western Australia (No 2) [2013] WASCA 269 
(‘Timbrell’), the Court of Appeal perceived speed relative to the circumstances. 
It was noted that although the speed of the vehicle was within the prescribed 
limit, a vehicle travelling at 70 km per hour ‘will collide with very considerable 
force’.121 It held that the offender’s driving of a heavy vehicle, a Toyota Prado 
four-wheel drive, through the red light in a ‘state of inattention’ in a ‘built-up 
area and at a time when it was highly likely that other vehicles would be present 
and travelling into his path’ gave rise to ‘the potential for serious injury’.122 
Therefore, even though the offender ‘was not travelling in excess of the speed 
limit … the potential for serious injury when a vehicle, travelling at that speed, 
collides with another vehicle is obvious’ and was ‘a serious breach of the 
standards expected of a reasonable driver’.123 
B Safety of Vehicle 
In isolation, WSM’s Nissan Navara could be construed as safe. This was how it 
was presented by the Supreme Court. It was not unroadworthy nor 
unregistered. However, the context of the driving and the threat it posed to 
Elijah Doughty put the safety of WSM’s twin cab ute in a different light. WSM’s 
vehicle weighed more than 1.5 tonnes — that would have been at least 15 times 
heavier and bigger than the approximately 55 kilogram dirt bike that Elijah 
Doughty was riding. The fact that the WSM deliberately ‘gave chase’124 to the 
bike that Elijah Doughty was riding — closely tailing him at speed — would 
make the four-wheel drive vehicle highly dangerous in the eyes of Elijah 
Doughty and onlookers. While the vehicle was not unsafe for the offender, or in 
terms of its likelihood of breaking down, it was unsafe from the standpoint of a 
child being chased by that vehicle. 
The Supreme Court may have taken note of the apposite words of the original 
sentencing judge in the case of Timbrell when her Honour said that motor 
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vehicles are ‘lethal weapons’ that are discharged when they are driven unsafely, 
and accordingly, ‘all drivers need to be on the utmost guard at all times, and 
taking into account not only the safety of themselves, but the safety of everyone 
else on the road’.125 
C Reckless Indifference of Driver 
Given the observation in relation to WSM chasing Elijah Doughty, relative 
speed and size of the vehicles, the conditions of the track, and the relative 
experience and age of the drivers, it is submitted that it was open to the Court 
to regard the offender as recklessly indifferent to Elijah Dought’s life. The 
Supreme Court recognised these circumstances, but nonetheless maintained 
that WSM actions were not recklessly indifferent. The Court explains that 
WSM’s: 
culpability lies in driving a very large and heavy vehicle very close to a small 
motorbike at a speed, and on terrain which made it difficult to predict the 
course which the motorbike would take, and which also made it difficult if not 
impossible … to either stop or change course so as to avoid a collision with the 
motorbike if the rider acted in a manner which was unexpected.126 
It is difficult to reconcile this observation with the finding that the WSM’s 
driving was not reckless — a finding which lessened the seriousness of the 
offence placing it at ‘lower end’ of the offending spectrum and, therefore, the 
length of WSM’s sentence. Other cases relegated to this lower end include 
Timbrell in which the 21-year-old driver went through a red light ‘as a result of 
inattention’ and thus caused the death of another driver.127 In other sentencing 
matters for dangerous driving causing death where the offender was 
characterised as ‘highly’ reckless and dangerous, such as the case of Kershaw v 
State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 111 (‘Kershaw’), the offending did 
not involve a pursuit of the victim. In Kershaw the offender failed to advert to a 
‘clearly visible and glaringly obvious hazard on the edge of the highway’ which 
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caused the death of two people.128 The majority in the Court of Appeal accepted 
that the offender’s ‘criminality was high’ because he was determined to ‘keep 
driving even though he knew he was fatigued and posed a risk to other road 
users.’129 In another case, LJM (a child) v State of Western Australia [2005] 
WASCA 172 (‘LJM’), a 14-year-old Aboriginal child was ‘hooning about’ on the 
boundaries of the Warmun Aboriginal community and lost control of the 
vehicle causing it to slide sideways into a steel power pole.130 The two 15-year-
old passengers consequently lost their lives. The sentencing judge described the 
incident as ‘the product of the deliberate’ manner of driving that meant that it 
fell ‘near the top of the range in dangerousness’.131 In the case of WSM, 
however, the actions could be characterised as more calculated and intentional 
than either Kershaw or LJM. Yet, recklessness was deemed not a factor in WSM 
despite the driver deliberately and dangerously chasing a child through tailing 
him in a large imposing vehicle in treacherous terrain at accelerating speed. 
D Absence of Alcohol 
The fact that the WSM chased down Elijah Doughty while sober also operated 
in his favour in sentencing. His unintoxicated state provided the offender with a 
double benefit. He was freed from being charged under s 59(a)(i) of the Road 
Traffic Act 1974 (WA) that carries a maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment for 
offenders driving under the influence. Instead, WSM was subject to s 59(b)(i), 
which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment due to the absence 
of this aggravating factor. WSM then gained an additional benefit because of 
his sobriety within this lesser offence.132 This appears to be a double dipping 
into the sentencing benefits for WMS. First, as was not intoxicated he was not 
charged under the aggravated offence and further, that he was not intoxicated 
was treated by the Court as a mitigating factor when considering his culpability 
under the lesser offence. 
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E Characterisation of the Harm and Impact of Offence 
Although the ‘principles of sentencing’ in the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA)133 
require a sentencing court to determine the seriousness of the offence with 
reference to the ‘vulnerability of any victim of the offence’,134 the vulnerability 
of Elijah Doughty was not presented in relation to WSM’s culpability. There are 
few details about Elijah Doughty’s vulnerability as a 14-year-old Indigenous 
boy who was a target of racist wrath by the non-Indigenous driving 
community. Elijah Doughty’s youth is also minimalised — the Supreme Court 
refers to him as a ‘young man’135 rather than a boy or child. Elijah Doughty is 
also not named. There is power and respect in the naming of victims of violence 
where culturally sanctioned.136 This is the logic behind the names on war 
memorials or in the memorials to victims of terrorism. It is to do the opposite 
of the thanatological accounting evident in the road tolls. Rather than reducing 
the dead to commensurable numbers, the unique specificity of the lives of the 
deceased are remembered and memorialised through being named. It must be 
noted that the Supreme Court’s non-disclosure did not come from respecting 
the wishes of Elijah Doughty’s family or community. His community in its 
social media and old media activity did not hide Elijah Doughty’s name, age, or 
image. In the sentencing remarks there was no sense that Elijah Doughty was a 
boy who just turned 14 or was a celebrated football player. This is a distinct 
contrast to the sentencing comments by the Supreme Court in, for example, 
State of Western Australia v Francis [2018] WASCR 106 (‘Francis’). This case is 
a mirror to WSM but with critical differences: the offender was an Indigenous 
adult man who chased in his motor vehicle a 15-year-old non-Indigenous 
youth that he believed was riding his stolen motorcycle and the pursuit ended 
with the child dying from fatal injuries after colliding with another vehicle.137 In 
Francis the victim’s youth and vulnerability is emphasised by his being named 
‘Master Chase’138 and being referred to as a ‘boy’,139 and the word ‘fear’ or its 
derivatives is deployed seven times by the Court to describe the victim’s state as 
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he was being chased by the offender’s vehicle.140 Tellingly, the word ‘fear’, nor 
any of its synonyms — ‘scared’, ‘frightened’, and so on — are not used to 
describe Elijah Doughty’s feelings in WSM. 
The harm in WSM is discussed in the task of weighing up, first, the 
‘culpability of the driving’, against second, ‘the fatal consequences’.141 The 
Supreme Court refers to the loss of life as ‘an element of the offence’ and 
requiring a sentence to reflect ‘the value which our community rightly attaches 
to the sanctity of human life and to the need to do everything we can to 
discourage its loss through tragic accidents of this kind’.142 
Moreover, the framing of the impact of the offence in these general terms 
and as a ‘tragic accident’ minimises the harm and sense of injustice that Elijah 
Doughty’s family and broader Indigenous community experienced from his 
death.143 It certainly does not account for, as discussed below, the aggravated 
sense within the Indigenous community that their children are being targeted 
by non-Indigenous vigilantes. It also does not recognise the injustice that has 
given the Indigenous community a feeling their lives don’t matter. An injustice 
that the family and community hoped would be addressed and remedied in 
sentencing.144 
Elijah Doughty’s mother’s victim impact statement is mentioned very 
briefly by the Supreme Court in terms of placing ‘no doubt’ that Elijah’s death 
‘has had a devastating effect on [Petrina James, Elijah’s mother] and her family’ 
with ‘indefinite’ ramifications.145 In other cases, such as Timbrell and Francis, 
sentencing courts have described victim impact statements as ‘absolutely 
heartbreaking’146 and ‘make for heart-wrenching reading’.147 Victim impact 
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statements have been described ‘in some detail’ as an ‘eloquent’ exposition of 
the ‘emotional pain and loss suffered’ by family and friends.148 
The Supreme Court does not aver to the impact on the local or broader 
Indigenous community. It was widely reported that the Indigenous community 
felt that their safety was threatened and they were under siege by the white 
vigilantism directed at Indigenous people in Kalgoorlie-Boulder. Vigilantism 
which, in their eyes, ultimately manifested in the death of Elijah Doughty.149 For 
Indigenous people, the fatal pursuit of Elijah Doughty was an attack on them all 
and their children. Well-known Aboriginal personality, Steven Oliver, said, 
‘When I look at a photo of Elijah, I see my nephews’.150 
F Significant Mitigating Factors: Offender’s Good Character and 
Hardship from Offence 
Mitigating factors pervade the sentencing remarks in WSM. The ‘good 
character’ of the offender is regarded as the central and most ‘significant’ 
mitigating factor151 and also has the effect of validating his version of the events 
leading to the death of Elijah Doughty. WSM’s ‘good character’ is evidenced by 
his ‘unblemished’ criminal record which is given ‘full weight’ in sentencing 
mitigation,152 his ‘full cooperation’ with the police,153 his guilty plea even though 
the plea was not accepted and the matter went to trial,154 his attempt to assist 
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Elijah Doughty after he killed him, and his remorse.155 Other factors that 
operated in WSM’s favour to mitigate his sentence included his age as an older 
man, his fatherhood to teenage and adult children, and his lifetime of 
employment. The Supreme Court concluded that the offender has ‘excellent’ 
prospects of rehabilitation and never repeating the offence156 and he thereby 
does ‘not pose any risk or threat to the community’.157 It states that a message of 
personal deterrence in sentencing WSM is not significant because of WSM’s 
good character and, as such, ‘there is no question of any need to protect the 
community from your conduct’.158 
However, the factors that the Supreme Court regarded as boding well for 
the offender’s character — his older age of 55 years, his employment (including 
at the time as a long-term dump truck operator) and his position as a parent 
(who is depicted in a caring way through helping get his children, who are in 
fact teenagers, ready for school)159 — could be regarded as aggravating 
culpability. Given WSM’s standpoint and experience with professional driving 
and his understanding of the vulnerability and unpredictability of children on a 
motorcycle, it could be expected that someone in the offender’s position would 
exercise greater care and be subject to a higher standard than others who do not 
possess these qualities. The fact that WSM would have been aware of the risks 
of driving a large and heavy four-wheel drive at speed in pursuit of a child on a 
motorcycle who could easily lose control on an unpredictable terrain makes his 
conduct particularly callous and reckless. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court accepted that WSM was doing the best he 
could, including in providing his account of the offence. The Supreme Court 
states that WSM did his best to ‘truthfully describe the events’.160 The Court 
tells the offender, ‘I have no reason to doubt that you were being open and 
candid with the police, and were endeavouring to recount the events … as 
accurately and truthfully as you could. … I accept the truthfulness of the 
version of events that you gave the police’.161 Even where there is evidence 
calling into question WSM’s account, his version is accepted. For instance, the 
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Supreme Court accepts the ‘truthfulness’ of WSM’s statement to the police that 
Elijah swerved in front of him,162 despite CCTV evidence that Elijah was riding 
in front of the vehicle. Nonetheless, in accepting WSM’s account, the Court 
emphasises his low culpability. 
The Supreme Court also highlighted the ‘hardship’ and ‘profound 
consequences’ flowing from the offence for the offender and his family, 
including the loss of their rental property and personal possessions, that the 
offender’s family had to move out of Kalgoorlie for their ‘safety’, and that the 
offender has experienced ‘guilt and anguish’.163 Indeed, along with the 
sympathetic portrayal of WSM fumbling with his mobile phone, WSM reads 
almost as an empathetic and sorry story of a middle-aged man’s very bad day. 
Much less detail is given on the hardship facing the victim’s family that the 
offender caused.  
G Where is General Deterrence? 
Sentencing involves sending a message of deterrence to the broader community 
to prevent a repetition of the crime, except in the most unusual instances.164 As 
a rule, general deterrence is of greater importance in circumstances where the 
crime is prevalent in a community. In cases, such as Gray v State of Western 
Australia [2015] WASCA 108 where the offender drove into a dust cloud and 
collided with a vehicle causing the death of the other driver, the sentencing 
court recognised that ‘general deterrence was an important sentencing 
consideration’.165 General deterrence is also invoked to set basic standards on 
the road. For example, in the case of Timbrell where the offender inadvertently 
drove through a red light.166 And, in Rubin v State of Western Australia [2016] 
WASCA 2 where a US citizen drove on the wrong side of the road causing two 
deaths where general deterrence was regarded as highly relevant in 
                                                
162 Ibid [6]. 
163 Ibid [28]–[30]. 
164 Paparone v The Queen [2000] WASCA 127 (12 May 2000), cited by Rubin v State of Western 
Australia [2016] WASCA 2 (12 October 2015) [36] (Martin CJ, Mazza JA and Hall J). 
165 Gray v State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 108 (28 May 2015) [104] (McLure P, Newnes 
and Mazza JJA). 
166 Timbrell v State of Western Australia (No 2) [2013] WASCA 269 (23 November 2013) [60], [82] 
(Buss, Mazza JJA and Hall J). 
2019]  129 
 
 Race, Australian Colonialism and Technologies of 
Mobility in Kalgoorlie 
sentencing.167 Most telling, however, are the comments in Francis. Having set 
out in detail the impact statements of the child victim’s parents — a child who 
died because an adult man chased his motorcycle believing it was stolen‚ the 
Supreme Court concluded: 
In short, their pain and suffering highlights the need for general deterrence in 
this type of offending. When people drive in the way that you did, when they 
intimidate and cause fear in other road users, lives can be lost and other lives are 
ruined.168 
The facts in WSM required a message of general deterrence that was not 
simply directed to deter dangerous driving broadly, but to specifically deter 
vigilantes who were chasing down Indigenous children. WSM dealt with 
general deterrence only in the broad sense: ‘to deter others from driving in such 
a way as to put life at risk’.169 However, the circumstances in WSM require a 
more nuanced approach to general deterrence that goes further than sending a 
message about driver safety. 
WSM should have sent a message to deter racially-fuelled vigilantism in the 
form of chasing of Indigenous children in a vehicle. The racist speech and 
vigilantism hosted by social media before and after Elijah Doughty’s death were 
public knowledge at the time of WSM’s sentencing. Indigenous community 
leaders such as Debbie Carmody were on the public record that non-
Indigenous male vigilantism intent on tracking down Aboriginal children was 
widespread and had a long history in Kalgoorlie-Boulder: ‘[g]rown white men 
in 4WDs are still chasing after our youth. It’s been happening for years’.170 
Further, the actions of the police who responded to WSM reporting of the 
break-in also demanded a serious response from the Court. In telling WSM to 
go to Gribble Creek Reserve to reclaim his motorcycles rather than undertaking 
the task of investigating and locating the stolen goods themselves, suggests tacit 
sanctioning by law enforcement of vigilantism by members of the non-
Indigenous community against Indigenous children. Moreover, these attitudes 
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reflect a deeper structure of injustice in which non-Indigenous community had 
profited from mining — enabling the purchase of expensive twin cab utes — 
while the local Indigenous people became impoverished from the theft and 
destruction of their land.171 
The message of general deterrence in WSM should have been directed to 
the non-Indigenous community that considers it acceptable to violently pursue 
Indigenous youth in revenge attacks. Given the widespread nature of these 
views in Kalgoorlie-Boulder, and the reports of harassment and attacks on 
Indigenous children, general deterrence should have been a significant 
sentencing principle. The Supreme Court needed to send a message — to the 
non-Indigenous community and law enforcement — that vigilante violence 
against children would not be condoned. Rather, it is submitted that the 
Supreme Court took the approach that the offence was an isolated, ‘tragic 
accident’172 which fails to recognise the surrounding vigilantism against 
Indigenous people. 
However, the Supreme Court considered that WSM’s retributive conduct 
following the theft of his bikes as immaterial to sentencing.173 WSM had 
submitted, for the purpose of mitigation, that he was seeking to reclaim his 
stolen goods. He intended for this to operate as a justification for ‘driving 
dangerously in the course of that pursuit’.174 Like the attending police, there is 
suggestion in the sentencing remarks that a degree of vigilantism is acceptable: 
that ‘reasonable pursuit may have been justified’ just not ‘dangerous pursuit’.175 
Rather than sending a clear message of general deterrence that Indigenous 
children should not be pursued by self-proclaimed law-enforcing civilians, 
there are statements supportive of ‘reasonable’ vigilantism. 
H Where is the Message of Condemnation? 
Sentencing is more than an exercise in punishing the individual. Rather, it plays 
an important declaratory role in drawing the lines between acceptable and 
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unacceptable conduct — what a society tolerates or condemns.176 At common 
law, public denunciation of the unlawful conduct of an offender should 
‘communicate society’s condemnation of the particular offender’s conduct’ 
because it encroaches on ‘our society’s basic code of values’, especially where it 
concerns the vulnerable’.177 However, the Supreme Court in WSM does not 
attend to this sentencing objective; nor does it seek to classify the vigilantism as 
an aggravating factor. Section 6(2) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) provides 
that a sentencing court must consider any aggravating factor, which includes 
any matter that ‘in the court’s opinion, increases the culpability of the 
offender’.178 While the Act does not stipulate what this may include, it was open 
to the Court to consider whether ‘the offence was motivated by hatred for or 
prejudice against a group of people’ which is a matter for aggravation in 
comparable sentencing legislation.179 
However, the only message of condemnation that the Supreme Court seeks 
to send to the community is towards the aggrieved community — substantially 
comprising Indigenous people — that protested against the unjust 
circumstances of Elijah Doughty’s death. They were aggrieved by the law’s 
failure to stop racist vigilantes, including the police failure to respond to their 
calls to investigate Kalgoorlie-Boulder residents on social media calling for their 
Aboriginal children to be hunted down.180 The tone in the sentencing remarks 
when discussing the actions of protestors on 30 August 2016 around the 
Kalgoorlie Courthouse is in particular contrast to the descriptions and epitaphs 
regarding WSM. The sense of moral condemnation and scorn is evident. The 
protestors are criticised as an ‘ill-informed’,181 ‘lawless’,182 ‘uncontrolled’,183 and 
an ‘unruly group’.184 The language seems to excise this group from the mythical 
‘community’ whose values of human life sentencing is to protect. 
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In short, the community that seems to be protected in WSM is the non-
Indigenous community of ute drivers and motorcycle owners who become 
enraged by provocative behaviour — an Indigenous boy on what looked like a 
stolen motorcycle — and recklessly pursued him down a muddy and slippery 
dirt track. It is not the scared and angry Indigenous community whose children 
are being surveilled and stalked in social media, whose images are being 
circulated, who are being singled out with racist hate speech, and who were 
denied access to the court to witness WSM’s committal. The sentencing is a 
carefully worded exercise in marginalisation. There was an opportunity for 
sentencing reasons to address the concerns of the Indigenous community. It 
could have sent a stronger message to the non-Indigenous community that 
racially motivated killings of Indigenous children is heinous and that the use of 
a motor vehicle to kill is still taking life. Further, it could have emphasised that 
even Indigenous children riding motorcycles — no matter how repugnant that 
might seem to elements in the non-Indigenous community — possess the 
indelible sanctity of human life. However, that was not how the mobile justice 
of the Supreme Court of Western Australia manifested. The concern was with 
WSM and his very bad day. In much of the sentencing, WSM is spoken about 
as a passive passenger to the events in August 2016 rather than the driver and 
instigator. The strongest condemnation in the text went to the Indigenous 
protestors that disrupted the committal. This is the well-worn track of rough 
justice of the settler-state. Violence towards Indigenous people is dismissed and 
minimalised while any sign of Indigenous resistance is vehemently 
condemned.185 
VI STILL TRAVELLING 
WSM was released on parole in March 2018.186 He had served just over 18 
months of the sentence. The parole board determined there was no risk to the 
Kalgoorlie-Boulder community from his release. Media reports indicate that on 
release WSM and his family moved interstate.187 The situation in Kalgoorlie-
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Boulder continued. While ‘Kalgoorlie Crimes Whinge and Whine’ and ‘Name 
Shame Crimes Kalgoorlie’ were shut down, new social media locations for 
racial vilification of Indigenous people emerged.188 Corresponding with WSM’s 
release there were reports and images of a police car in Perth running down an 
18 year old Indigenous man, William Farmer.189 Three months after WSM’s 
release there was the sentencing in Francis where the offender — incensed at 
the theft of his motorcycle chased a motorcycle riding youth causing a fatal 
incident — was sentenced to seven years. The reason that Francis is a mirror for 
WSM was the driver, Jude Francis — not protected by an alias at trial or in the 
media — was an Indigenous man, while the deceased was a non-Indigenous 
boy.190 
Elijah Doughty’s death and the subsequent treatment of WSM by the 
settler state’s courts shows that mobility and its assident technologies infuse the 
Australian colonial project. Racial conflicts fermented in Kalgoorlie-Boulder 
predicated on non-Indigenous reactions to Indigenous youths moving about in 
public and particularly riding motorcycles that might not belong to them. 
These become posted and shared through mobile phones and social media. The 
decisions of the Supreme Court showed a predication towards the legitimacy of 
non-Indigenous mobility and a hostility towards open manifestations of 
Indigenous mobility. WSM is treated with sympathy while the concerns of the 
Indigenous community are marginalised. Further, the affront to the settler state 
of a group of protesters venting frustration and grief on being denied access to 
the courthouse is particularly emphasised — seemingly as more problematic 
than the running down of Indigenous boy on a motorcycle. 
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In conclusion, the Australian settler state is still travelling. Essential to the 
settler state has been discrete and identifiable technologies of mobility — the 
bullock wagon, the steam train, the wool clippers, the motor vehicle, and the 
telephone. Over the decades each has been instrumental in addressing the 
‘tyrannies of distance’. Of fundamental concern has been the controlling, 
regulating, and preventing of Indigenous mobility. Elijah Doughty’s death 
shows the continual centrality of the motor vehicle as an instrument through 
which non-Indigenous people can violently manage Indigenous people. It also 
shows the motor vehicle as a contested resource that non-Indigenous people, 
with the backing of the settler state, regard as rightfully belonging to them. 
Further, Elijah Doughty’s death shows the incorporation of mobile media into 
the colonialist project. Mobile phones and social media platforms became a 
resource and tool through which surveillance and mobilisation against 
Indigenous people can be undertaken by members of the non-Indigenous 
community. Again, seemingly with the tacit support of the settler state. 
Technological objects are never innocent. A motor vehicle, a mobile phone, 
a social media platform are connected with wider contexts.191 To use and 
consume a technology is to participate in networks that exploit, normalise, and 
disrupt social and economic relations.192 This is not to suggest that technologies 
cannot be used in emancipatory and empowering ways, to create ‘new 
power’,193 as witnessed by the #MeToo movement and possibly by the 
#JusticeForElijah tag used by members of the Kalgoorlie-Boulder Indigenous 
community. Indigenous Australians, including those in Kalgoorlie, use both 
mobile media and motor vehicles to challenge the colonial project of the settler 
state. But mechanised and virtual mobility is a double-edged sword. As 
Heimans and Timms point out, participatory social media has created ‘new 
power’ that is as much a source of dissent of the disempowered, as hatred by the 
empowered, citing Trump and racist interventions.194  
In this study, what becomes clear is how closely intertwined Australian 
colonialism is with these technologies of mobility. They facilitate a culture of 
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192 Ibid. 185. 
193 Jeremy Heimans and Henry Timms, New Power: How Power works in our Hyperconnected World 
- and How to Make it Work for You (Pan MacMillan, 2018) 3-4. 
194 Ibid. See also Donna Haraway who identified in the 1980s how the then emerging communication, 
command and control technologies which were birthed and nurtured in war can be co-oped for 
peace: Donna Haraway, 'A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist Feminism in the 
1980s' (1984) 2(4) Australian Feminist Studies 1. 
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land dispossession and repression of Indigenous people in Kalgoorlie-Boulder. 
The drive to rectify the distribution of mobility resources is given precedence 
over the human injury and suffering that follows for Indigenous people. The 
sentencing remarks for the offender responsible for Elijah Doughty’s death 
reinstate colonial mobilities and their destructive effects on Indigenous 
livelihoods and future generations. 
